DISABILITY

LAW-BURDEN

OF PROOF-AN INDIVIDUAL CHALLENG-

ING THE CAPACITY OF A DEVELOPMENTALLY-DISABLED PERSON TO

MAKE AN INDEPENDENT DECISION BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROVING BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT THE DISABLED
PERSON HAS THE SPECIFIC INCAPACITY TO DECIDE-In re M.R.,

135 NJ. 155, 638 A.2d 1274 (1994).

The treatment of the developmentally-disabled, particularly
the mentally retarded, evidences a long history of oppression, segregation, and prejudice. 1 Recently, however, a growing concern
for the rights of the physically and mentally disabled has developed. 2 At the federal and local level, lawmakers have enacted ex1 Marie Appleby, The Mentally Retarded: The Need for Intermediate Scrutiny, 7 B.C.
THIRD WoRLD LJ. 109, 112-13 (1987). The discrimination and mistreatment of persons with mental retardation created the need for an intermediate level of scrutiny to
review governmental action that singularly affects mentally-retarded citizens. Id. at
130. The mistreatment of the mentally retarded can be traced back to the colonial
period during which society classified retarded individuals as witches. Id. at 113. The
evil perception of the mentally retarded continued for centuries until physicians eventually began to conduct research in the 19th century. Id. The studies incorrectly
concluded that all types of mental retardation were hereditary. Id. It was not until
the 1940s that professionals and society finally understood that genetics only contributed to a small percentage of mental retardation and that the majority of the underlying causes were unknown. Id.
The earliest governmental institutionalization of the mentally retarded reflected
sub-human conditions. Id. at 114. Many residents were routinely handcuffed and
chained and, in some instances, were displayed for profit. Id. With studies confirming mental retardation as a genetic trait, support grew for sterilizing and eliminating
the mentally retarded from society. Id. at 113, 115.
Conditions in the first half of the 20th century continued to subject the mentally
retarded to discrimination and mistreatment. Id. at 115. Institutionalized individuals
continued to receive less than adequate care. Id. For instance, treatment for the
mentally retarded consisted of straitjackets, lock-ups, medication, and physical punishment, and residents were often restricted to bed with no more than a diaper. Id. at
116. Reform finally occurred in the 1970s with the advent of deinstitutionalization.
Id. See also William Christian, Note, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REv. 409, 410-11 (1994)
(suggesting the goal of normalization as a means to enable mentally-retarded individuals with a lifestyle most closely analogous to nondisabled society); Laura A. Lorenzo,
Comment, Societal PrejudiceReflected in Our Courts: The Unfavorable Treatment of the Mentally Retarded, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 771, 771 (1992) (exposing the discriminatory
treatment of persons with mental retardation by society and the courts). But see Savidge v. Fincannon, 836 F.2d 898, 900 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that as recently as 1986,
inadequate conditions existed at the Fort Worth State School for the Retarded).
2 See James W. Ellis, Decisions By And ForPeople With Mental Retardation: Balancing
Considerationsof Autonomy and Protection,37 ViL. L. Rsv. 1779, 1779 (1992) (recognizing the difficulty in accommodating the autonomy of disabled individuals with society's interest in protecting these individuals from harm). Ellis discussed the need to
strike a balance between a mentally-retarded person's interest in autonomous decision making and the need to protect that person from being deprived of her liberty
4 0'/
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tensive legislation to protect the disabled from discrimination.' In
addition to the recent legislative efforts, judicially appointed guardianships4 have also served as a means to protect the best interests of
5
the developmentally-disabled.
under the false pretext of consent. Id. at 1809. See also Lawrence A. Frolik, Plenary
Guardianship: An Analysis, A Critique and A ProposalFor Reform, 23 A~iz. L. REv. 599,
601, 660 (1981) (emphasizing that guardianship reform is urgently necessary to better
protect the rights of the mentally incompetent and that any comprehensive reform
requires the abolishment of plenary guardianship); cf Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing
Competency as a Construction of Difference: A Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of
Persons with Disabilities,47 U. MIAMi L. REv. 867, 881-82 (1993) (proposing a reconstruction of the traditional model of legal decision making by implementing a rights
analysis from the perspective of individuals with disabilities).
3 See, e.g., Equal Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities (American Disabilities Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, §12101(b) (Supp. 111991) (mandating the cessation of discrimination against the disabled in the workplace, state and local
government services, public transportation, and public accommodations); see also Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:6D-1 to 6D-22 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1995) (defining developmental disability and protecting the rights of the developmentally disabled).
As indicated by the timely enactment of legislation, the NewJersey State Constitution, and recent judicial decisions, "the clear public policy of this state is to respect
the right of self-determination of all people, including the developmentally-disabled."
In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 166, 638 A.2d 1274, 1279 (1994). Justice Pollock indicated
that all persons, including the developmentally-disabled, derive such rights from the
state constitution, which states that "'[a]ll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty... and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness.'" Id. (quoting N.J. CONST. art. I, cl. 1.).
4 A guardianship is defined as "a legal arrangement under which one person (a
guardian) has the legal right and duty to care for another (the ward) and his or her
property." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 707 (6th ed. 1990). A court establishes a guardi-

anship as a result of the ward being unable to legally act on his or her own behalf. Id.
For a discussion of guardianship arrangements, see John Parry, Selected Recommendations from the National GuardianshipSymposium at Wingspread, 12 MENTAL & PHYS.DISABmrr= L. REP. 398, 399 (1988) (describing the guardianship concept and guardianship
arrangements).
The need to establish a formal guardianship arrangement grew from society's
need to effectuate substitute decision making concerning such questions as "when
should a substitute decision-maker be appointed; over what personal and property
rights should the substitute make decisions; and who should be the one to exercise
these powers." Id. at 398. Parry indicates that guardianship arrangements can be
classified into four categories: plenary guardianship, guardianship of the person,
guardianship of the estate, and limited guardianship. Id. at 399. A plenary guardianship arrangement vests the guardian with the authority to make decisions on behalf of
the ward at an incompetency adjudication. Id. A guardianship of the estate appointment concerns the financial and property rights of the incompetent while a guardianship of the person arrangement encompasses the remaining rights involved with
personal decision-making. Id. The last arrangement, a limited guardianship, particularizes the decision making dynamics to the individual needs of the ward. Id. The
guardianship order only comprises those decisions that concern the ward's incapacity.
Id.
5 See Frolik, supra note 2, at 601-02. Instituted as a means of protection for those
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Despite these efforts to maximize a disabled person's autonomy, a guardianship appointment, in particular, raises crucial
questions as to the effective preservation of a developmentally-disabled person's right to self-determination. 6 Courts are placed in a
precarious situation that requires a balancing between a developmentally-disabled person's individual autonomy
and the longstand7
ing judicial concerns for their best interests.
In April 1994, the New Jersey Supreme Court was called on to
determine the extent to which a generally incompetent developmentally-disabled person should determine where to reside.' In a
unanimous opinion, the court held in In re M.R that the individual
challenging a developmentally-disabled person's capacity to make
an independent decision bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the disabled person has the specific incapacity to decide.9 The court further declared that a finding that an
individual is mentally incompetent does not necessitate an absolute
deprivation of an individual's right to make all decisions for himself."0 In furtherance of that finding, the court held that the priunable to protect themselves, state law mandates the appointment of a guardian for
those persons who do not possess the capacity to take care of themselves or their
property. Id. The state requires a guardianship appointment if an individual is mentally incapacitated because of mental illness, mental retardation, senility, old age, or
drug/alcohol conditions that render her unable to make responsible decisions regarding her person or property. Id. at 602-03.
6 See M.R, 135 N.J. at 165, 638 A.2d at 1279 (finding that the best interest of the
developmentally-disabled must be balanced with their right of self-determination).
See also Parry, supra note 4, at 399 (indicating the difficulty in finding a balance between an incompetent individual's rights and society's need to ensure their protection in modern society where such interests are not clearly defined); Ellis, supra note
2, at 1779 (stating that decisions regarding the lives of individuals with mental retardation must weigh the personal interests of those individuals against the public policy
concerns of the state). Ellis contends:
On the one hand there is the desire to accommodate the autonomous
choices of individuals with disabilities and enhance their ability to make
decisions affecting their own lives. On the other hand, there is also a
commonly felt need to protect individuals with substantial mental disabilities from the adverse consequences of potentially unwise, ill-informed or incompetently made decisions. Each of these two impulses is
a fully understandable and reasonable concern, and yet each may be the
source of abuse of persons with disabilities.
Id.
7 MR, 135 N.J. at 165, 638 A.2d at 1279.
s Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 1276.
9 Id. at 169, 638 A.2d at 1281. Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Clifford, Handler, O'Hern, Garibaldi, and Stein joined justice Pollock in ruling for the affirmance,
reversal, and remand of the appellate division's judgment. Id. at 179, 638 A.2d at
1286.
10 Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 1285.
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mary duty of counsel for a developmentally-disabled person is to
protect that person's fundamental rights,' particularly the right of
12
self-determination.
Since her parents divorced in 1979, M.R. has resided with her
mother while visiting with her father on weekends and in the summer.'" M.R. is a twenty-one-year-old woman with Down's Syndrome14 whose condition is considered to be one of mild to
moderate mental retardation. 5 As she reached her eighteenth
birthday, M.R. began to express a desire to leave her mother's
home and move to her father's residence.' 6 The court recognized
that each home presented a loving environment for M.R. but
11 The Supreme Court has long recognized that the concept of liberty embodied
in the Fourteenth Amendment protects those personal rights which are fundamental.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that a woman's right to
privacy in deciding whether or not to terminate her pregnancy is a fundamental right
under the Fourteenth Amendment); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972)
(extending the right to use contraceptives to all persons); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (recognizing that the right to privacy encompasses an individual's right to marry); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (finding a state act that prevented parents from sending their children to private schools
was an unreasonable interference with a parent's right to decide the upbringing and
schooling of their children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing that the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment encompass the right
to marry, raise children, and establish a home).
12 M.R., 135 NJ. at 177, 638 A.2d at 1285. The court recognized the potential for
a conflict to arise between a mentally disabled person's preference and what serves
that person's best interest. Id. at 178, 638 A.2d 1285 (citation omitted). In such a
situation, the attorney for the disabled person may advise the court of the possible
need for an appointment of a guardian ad litem. Id.
'3 Id. at 159, 163, 638 A.2d at 1276, 1278.
14 Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 1276. Down's Syndrome is a "condition characterized by
a small, anteroposteriorly flattened skull, short, flat-bridged nose, epicanthal fold,
short phalanges, and widened space between the first and second digits of hands and
feet, with moderate to severe mental retardation." THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED
MEDICAL-LEGAL DICTIONARY 691 (1987). The scientific name for Down's Syndrome is
trisomy-21. BuTTERWORTH'S MEDICO-LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 172 (1987). The classification as trisomy-21 stems from the condition of the affected child's nuclei which only
contains 47 chromosomes. Id.
15 M.R, 135 NJ. at 159, 638 A.2d at 1276. According to the American Association
on Mental Retardation:
"Mental retardationrefers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly sub-average intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the
following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care,
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and
safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation
manifests before age 18."
See Ellis, supra note 2, at 1781-82 (quoting AMERICAN ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION,
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS 5 (9th
ed.161992)).
Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 1276. M.R.'s mother instituted legal action to be ap-
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noted that the mother and the father disagreed as to the appropriate amount of freedom M.R. should have in her daily life.1 7 The
father's parenting method concentrated on presenting M.R. with
options that ultimately were to be decided by her."' In contrast,
the mother's approach focused on maintaining a balance between
M.R.'s freedom of choice and the need for structure in her daily
life.1 9

. Once M.R. began to verbalize her desire to remain in the lessstructured environment created by her father, M.R.'s mother instituted a guardianship action in the New Jersey Superior Court,
Chancery Division.2" Seeking an appointment as M.R.'s general
guardian, M.R.'s mother claimed that her daughter lacked the specific capacity to decide where to reside.21 The trial court deterpointed as M.R.'s legal guardian after M.R. expressed that she wanted to live with her
father. Id.
17 Id. at 161, 638 A.2d at 1277.
18 See id. (indicating that M.R.'s father gave her the freedom to select her clothes,
her daily activities, and most other decisions that affected how she spent her time).
While staying at her father's, M.R. answered the phone, attended dances, went bowling, and attended Sunday School. Id. If M.R. was given the opportunity to live with
her father, M.R. would be given the choice to attend dances and participate in sports,
such as swimming, aerobics, and basketball. Id. Her father described his home as one
that provided a good, comfortable atmosphere for M.R. Id.
19 M.R, 135 N.J. at 162, 638 A.2d at 1277. M.R.'s mother testified that having rules
and a structured life, at both home and school, is important for M.R. Id. She stated
that she gave her daughter some choices but believed being too free could be detrimental. Id. While at her mother's home, M.R. performed household chores, assisted
with the food shopping, participated in track and field at school, went to the movies
with friends, and camped with her mother and stepfather. Id. Occasionally, M.R.'s
mother allowed her to accompany her stepfather to work on his company's truck, but
she was not permitted to answer the business phone. Id. She was, however, allowed to
answer the family phone. Id.
20 Id. at 159, 638 A.2d at 1276. As required by Rule 4:86-4(b) of the New Jersey
Rules Governing Civil Practice, the trial court appointed Paul G. Hunczak to serve as
M.R.'s attorney. Id. at 159-60, 638 A.2d at 1276 (citing N.J. CT. R. 4:86-4(b)).
21 Id. at 160, 638 A.2d at 1276. Conversely, M.R.'s father contended that M.R. had
the ability to decide for herself where to live and her decision was to live with him. Id.
at 163, 638 A.2d at 1278.
In determining the crucial issue as to M.R.'s capacity to express her desire to live
with her father, both sides presented several witnesses. See id. at 160, 638 A.2d at
1276. The court selected Dr. Deborah Dawson, a psychologist who serves as the director of the Guardianship Evaluation Project of the Center for Applied Psychology at
Rutgers University, to examine M.R. Id. The tests conducted by Dr. Dawson revealed
that M.R. was mildly retarded, placing her level of social behavior to be the equivalent
of a six or eight-year-old and her adaptive behavior skills at the level of approximately
an eight-year-old. Id. As a result of her examination, Dr. Dawson concluded that
M.R. had the ability to express a preference. Id. Her testimony indicated that the
choice of where to live was a very specific choice and one that M.R. was capable of
understanding. Id.
To support her contention that M.R. lacked the specific capacity to decide where
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mined that M.R. was unable to consider the consequences of the
appointment of either parent as her guardian and lacked the specific capacity to decide where to live.22 As the party seeking to
change the status quo, the trial court held that M.R.'s father bore
the burden of proof to establish. M.R.'s competency. 23 Because
to live, M.R.'s mother presented two witnesses. Id. The mother's first witness was
David Hegner, the chairman of the Special Education Department at M.R's school.
Id. Mr. Hegner holds a master's degree in special education and also had been M.R.'s
special education teacher for the two years prior to the trial. Id. Mr. Hegner's analysis of M.R. revealed that she functioned at the second or third-grade level, which is at
the level of an eight or nine-year-old. Id. He expressed skepticism regarding M.R.'s
ability to make rational adult choices despite his acknowledgment that M.R. was able
to make certain decisions at a level more advanced than a third grader. Id., 638 A.2d
at 1276-77. Mr. Hegner concluded that M.R.'s expressed preference to live with her
father was merely attributable to M.R's association of fun with her father's house. Id.,
638 A.2d at 1277. Therefore, Mr. Hegner determined M.R. was unable to make an
"adult decision" regarding her residence. Id.
The second witness to testify on the mother's behalf was Ira Yom. Id. at 161, 638
A.2d at 1277. Mr. Yorn is a certified school psychologist and was M.R.'s school psychologist and case manager for the previous two years. Id. Mr. Yorn conducted tests
that revealed M.R's educable level was in the mentally-deficient range. Id. Specifically, M.R.'s verbal skills were equal to that of a seven to ten-year-old and her nonverbal skills fell into the range between a six-and-one-half-year-old and an eight-year-old.
Id. Mr. Yorn categorized M.R.'s practical and social judgment to be that of a six-yearold and considered her overall functioning to be the equivalent of an eight or nineyear-old. Id.
22 Id. at 164, 638 A.2d at 1278. When interviewed by the court, MR. expressed
enthusiasm about her summer job, which required living with her mother. Id. at 163,
638 A.2d at 1278. M.R. selected her father, however, when asked whom the court
should appoint to assist her in making difficult decisions. Id.
Despite the fact that M.R. expressed a preference, the court found M.PR was difficult to understand. Id. at 164, 638 A.2d at 1278. According to the court, M.R.'s reasons for wanting to live with her father were illogical and irrational. Id. The court felt
that M.R. associated her father's house with happier times in contrast to her mother's
home, which represented school and rules. Id. at 163, 638 A.2d at 1278. M.R.'s reasons for wanting to live with her father, as summarized by the court, were "boys, babies, and boyfriends." Id. The court determined that M.R. did not fully comprehend
the nature of the proceeding and she was unable to truly consider the ramifications of
either parent's appointment. Id. at 164, 638 A.2d at 1278. The court relied on Mr.
Hegner's testimony that indicated it was difficult to determine whether M.R. would
understand the significance of where she chose to live. Id.
The court disregarded testimony from Dr. Dawson, who indicated that ignoring
M.R's wishes would result in a significant impact to M.R-'s self-esteem. Id. at 163, 638
A.2d at 1278. Dr. Dawson's testimony, according to the court, proved to be inconsistent with her written findings. Id. Dr. Dawson testified that M.R. was capable of
choosing with whom she wanted to live but indicated in her reports that M.R. was
incapable of deciding which parent should be her guardian. Id. The court was unable to reconcile how M.R. could have the capacity to know with whom she wanted to
reside but not have the ability to know who should serve as her guardian and look out
for her best interest. Id. at 163-64, 638 A.2d at 1278.
23 M.R, 135 N.J. at 164, 638 A.2d at 1278. Although the court acknowledged that
M.R. expressed a preference to live with her father, the question remained whether
M.R. was capable of expressing a reliable preference. Id. at 163, 638 A.2d at 1278.
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M.R.'s father failed to meet his burden, the trial court awarded
guardianship to M.R.'s mother.2 4
The New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division affirmed
the lower court's decision placing the burden of proof to establish
specific capacity on M.R.'s father.2 5 One judge dissented, contending that the burden of proof should have been imposed on M.R.'s
mother as the individual claiming that her daughter lacked the
specific capacity to select her residence.2 6 M.R.'s father appealed
the appellate division's ruling to the New Jersey Supreme Court,
which granted certification to identify the correct standard for determining the specific capacity of a developmentally-disabled person to select her residence and to clarify the appropriate role of
appointed counsel in a guardianship action.2 7
Justice Pollock, writing for the court, affirmed the declaration
of M.R.'s incompetence, reversed the appellate division's appointment of M.R.'s mother as guardian, and remanded the case to the
Chancery Division.2 8 The justice reasoned that the court needed
to strike a better balance between a developmentally-disabled person's right of self-determination and the traditional judicial concerns for that person's best interest. 29 Accordingly, the NewJersey
Supreme Court imposed the burden of proof on the individual
challenging the specific capacity of a developmentally-disabled person rather than on the person affirming the disabled person's capacity."0 To further support a mentally-disabled person's right to
individual autonomy, the court clarified that the primary role of
appointed counsel for a mentally-disabled person is to vigorously
protect that person's rights, particularly the right to make
31
decisions.
Because the father was the individual claiming M.R. had the capacity to express a
preference, the court imposed the burden on him "to convince the court by a preponderance of the evidence that it's more likely than not that [M.R.] has the capacity
in this limited area to decide for herself." Id.
24 Id. at 165, 638 A.2d at 1279. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing M.R.'s father's inability to establish his daughter's specific capacity to determine
where to reside).
25 Id. at 164, 638 A.2d at 1279.
26 Id.
27 In re M.R., 133 NJ. 444, 627 A.2d 1148 (1993).
28 MR., 135 N.J. at 179, 638 A.2d at 1286. Justice Pollock indicated that pending
the result of the remand, M.R. would remain with her mother and continue to visit
with her father in accordance with the judgment of the chancery division. Id.
29 Id. at 165, 638 A.2d at 1279.
30 Id. at 168-69, 638 A.2d at 1281.
3' See id. at 177-78, 638 A.2d at 1285 (noting that an attorney should advocate any
decision his developmentally-disabled client makes).
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The NewJersey Supreme Court's decision in M.R. was decided
against a backdrop of existing New Jersey case law that slowly
forged new ground for the fights of the mentally disabled. 2 Levine
v. Institution and Agencies Department of N.J."3 was an early case that
failed to recognize the Legislature's strong moral and legal obligation to provide care for the handicapped. 34 The plaintiffs in Levine
were the parents of two severely retarded children who were residents of a state institution for the mentally disabled. 5 The parents, having the financial resources, were required by statute to pay
the cost of their children's care.3 The parents contended that
their children were being denied their right to a free public education because the governing statutory framework did not consider
the residential care provided by the plaintiffs as education.3 7 The
court held that the education clause's guarantee of a thorough and
efficient education did not extend to profoundly retarded children
and the residential care programs entailed in their total
habilitation. 8
32 See, e.g., New Jersey Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't of
Human Servs., 89 N.J. 234, 251, 445 A.2d 704, 713 (1982) (holding that state statutes
grant mentally-retarded people the legal right to adequate training, habilitation, education, care, and protection in accordance with their individual needs in an environment that is least restrictive of their personal liberty); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 345,
486 A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985) (recognizing that courts, as guardians of personal rights,
have a particular responsibility to protect the right of self-determination).
33 84 N.J. 234, 418 A.2d 229 (1980).
34 See id. at 269, 418 A.2d at 247-48 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
85 Id. at 238, 418 A.2d at 231.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 244, 418 A.2d at 234. The New Jersey Constitution provides that "the
Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4, d. 1. Building
upon the goals espoused by the constitution, the New Jersey Legislature enacted the
Public School Education Act of 1975. Levine, 84 N.J. at 247, 418 A.2d at 236. (citing
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A.7A-4 (West 1989)). The court stressed that the Education Act
further articulated the constitution's objective of providing children with an education so that they may become productive individuals in society. Id.
The plaintiffs contended that the rehabilitative care they provided for their institutionalized children should be considered education within the meaning of the constitution. Id. at 244, 418 A.2d at 234. If considered education, the plaintiffs would be
entitled to have the residential care furnished free of charge at the expense of the
public. Id. at 255, 418 A.2d at 240.
38 Levine, 84 N.J. at 250, 418 A.2d at 236. The court maintained that the analytical
framework behind the New Jersey Constitution's free public education clause was to
encourage effective representation and create an enlightened democracy. Id. at 245,
418 A.2d at 234-35. See also Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295
(1973) (emphasizing that the thorough and efficient education clause serves as a
means to provide a child with the opportunity to equip himself as a citizen and a
competitor in the work force).
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Although the Levine court failed to extend the right of educa3 9
tion to the disabled, the New Jersey Supreme Court in In re Grady
recognized a developmentally-disabled person's fundamental right
to privacy concerning forced sterilization.4 In Grady, parents of a
mentally-retarded woman with Down's Syndrome4 1 sought to have
their daughter sterilized.4 2 In reaching its decision, the Grady
court recognized that the fundamental right of privacy encompasses the right to choose among procreation, sterilization and
other modes of contraception.43 The court indicated, however,
Building upon this framework, the Levine court submitted that every child's right
to education is not protected under the education clause of the constitution. Levine,
84 N.J. at 251, 418 A.2d at 237. The court distinguished those children who fell into
the category of severe mental retardation and considered it unrealistic "to equate the
type of care and habilitation which such children require for their health and survival
with 'education' in the sense that that term is used in the constitution." Id. at 250,
418 A.2d at 237. The Levine court posited that the children falling into the severelyhandicapped category were best served by being institutionalized and were not "capable either of receiving or of benefitting from any additional instruction or education
as such." Id. at 254, 418 A.2d at 240. Therefore, the court rejected the notion that
the residential care needed to ensure their daily well-being qualified as education
within the meaning of the constitution's education clause. Id. at 254-55, 418 A.2d at
240.
39 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
40 Id. at 245, 426 A.2d at 472 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
41 See supra note 14 (defining Down's Syndrome).
42 Grady, 85 N.J. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470. Lee Ann Grady has remained in the care
of her parents since birth. Id. at 240-41, 426 A.2d at 469-70. At age 19, Lee Ann's
physical development has progressed normally but her emotional and social development has not. Id. at 242, 426 A.2d at 470. Recognizing her lack of sexual awareness,
Lee Ann's parents have provided their daughter with birth control pills. Id. Motivated by their desires to provide Lee Ann with a more independent lifestyle, her parents seek permanent contraception prior to placing Lee Ann in a less restrictive
environment. Id.
43 Id. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475. The Grady court acknowledged that the right to
procreate is a basic, fundamental right of which an individual is permanently deprived by forced sterilization. Id. at 245, 426 A.2d at 472 (quoting Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). The court in Grady observed that personal
autonomy over procreation and contraception had been given constitutional recognition by the Supreme Court. Id. at 247-48, 426 A.2d at 473 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1985)). The Grady court added that the limitation of the
Griswold decision to only married persons was abandoned in Eisenstadt v. Baird by extending the right to use contraceptives to all persons. Id. at 248, 426 A.2d at 473
(citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972)).
The court in Grady maintained, however, that the right to sterilization had not yet
been expressly protected by the Supreme Court. Id. at 248, 426 A.2d at 474. Incidentally, the court advised that several district courts have acknowledged the existence of
such a right. Id. at 248-49, 426 A.2d at 474 (citing Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp.,
475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Ruby v. Massey, 452 F. Supp. 361 (D. Conn. 1978); Peck
v. Califano, 454 F. Supp. 484 (D. Utah 1977); Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50
(Ch. Div. 1975)).
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that a developmentally-disabled person may be incapable of exercising his or her constitutional right to privacy.4 4 In the event of
such a situation, the Grady court held, a court incurs the responsibility to exercise that right on the incompetent's behalf in a manner that reflects the best interests of the incompetent.4 5
The court in Grady further declared that the parens patriae
power4 6 of the state encompasses the decision of whether a court
may give consent for sterilization on behalf of an individual who
does not have the capability of consenting or withholding consent
herself.4 7 The Grady court reasoned that having the court exercise
The Grady court also offered the reasoning of the New Jersey Supreme Court:
The right to be sterilized also derives from the rationale of our decision
in In re Quinlan. There we held that a person has a constitutional right
to discontinue use of artificial life-sustaining apparatus when the prognosis for returning to cognitive or sapient life is dim. Our holding grew
out of a belief that, under some circumstances, an individual's personal
right to control her own body and life overrides the state's general interest in preserving life. A decision to be sterilized is also a part of an
individual's personal right to control her own body and life. The state's
interest in procreation can not be greater than its interest in preserving
life. If one can decide to forego artificial life-preservation and thereby
sacrifice life, then one can certainly decide to forego reproductive capacity and thereby relinquish the ability to procreate. Therefore, the
right to be sterilized is included in the privacy rights protected by the
federal Constitution.
Grady, 85 N.J. at 249, 426 A.2d at 474.
44 Id. at 250, 426 A-2d at 474. The Grady court recognized that Lee Ann, like the
comatose individual in Quinlan, was incapable of exercising her fundamental rights.
Id. As a result of her mental deficiencies, Lee Ann was unable to make a meaningful
choice between sterilization, procreation, or an alternative means of contraception.
Id. The court maintained, however, that "her inability should not result in the forfeit
of this constitutional interest or of the effective protection of her 'best interests.'" Id.
To preserve her right of whether to procreate, the Grady court instructed that the
right must be asserted on Lee Ann's behalf. Id. at 250-51, 426 A.2d at 475.
45 Id. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475.
46 Black's Law Dictionarydefines parenspatriaeas "the principle that the state must
care for those who cannot take care of themselves, such as minors who lack proper
care and custody from their parents." BLACK's LAW DIC-rONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
Parenspatriae literally means "parent of the country." Id. Traditionally, parens patriae
referred to the state's role as sovereign and guardian of individuals under a legal
disability. Id.
47 Grady, 85 N.J. at 259, 426 A.2d at 479. The Grady court rejected the imposition
of a strict necessity showing prior to authorizing the sterilization of an incompetent
person. Id. at 262, 426 A.2d at 481. The court reminded that the situation was not
one of compulsory sterilization but rather one requested by the parents of an incompetent person. Id. Therefore, the state's interest, according to the court, was much
broader than merely preventing the birth of genetically impaired children. Id. The
court warned that imposing a strict necessity standard would infringe on the parens
patriaepower of the state to "compensate for an incompetent person's inability to
exercise her own constitutional rights concerning contraception." Id. at 262-63, 426
A.2d at 481 (citation omitted).
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a decision on behalf of an incompetent person produces a more
humane and compassionate result than leaving the incompetent
48
person without a means to exercise a constitutional right.
In further support of the rights of the disabled, the New Jersey
Supreme Court significantly altered its understanding of the education clause of the State constitution in New Jersey Association for
Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. New Jersey Department of Human Services.4 9 In
Association for Retarded Citizens, the New Jersey Supreme Court ad-

dressed the need for state statutes to maximize the potential of developmentally-disabled persons while preserving the maximum
extent of personal liberty. 50 The court posited that emotionallydisabled children at institutions for the mentally retarded have the
legal right to a thorough and efficient education as granted by
state statutes.51
48 Id. at 261, 426 A.2d at 481. The court in Grady indicated that Lee Ann shared
the same constitutional right as everyone else to decide whether to be sterilized. Id.,
426 A.2d at 480. The court admitted, however, that Lee Ann did not have the ability
to make such a decision for herself. Id., 426 A.2d at 481. Although the decision
would not be made personally by Lee Ann, the Grady court recognized that the decision made by the court is a genuine decision governed by the same interests Lee Ann
might pursue if she had the opportunity to decide herself. Id.
49 89 NJ. 234, 445 A.2d 704 (1982).
50 Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 89 NJ. at 252, 445 A.2d at 713. The plaintiffs in Ass'n
for Retarded Citizens were residents of the Hunterdon State School. Id. at 238, 445 A.2d
at 706. Hunterdon is a residential facility for the mentally retarded operated by the
Division of Mental Retardation of the New Jersey Department of Human Services
(hereafter "Division"). Id. As of 1979, the Division operated eight similar facilities
that housed approximately 8,000 persons. Id. At the time of trial, 988 residents lived
in Hunterdon, more than half of whom were school-age children. Id. The Division
reported that over 90% of the Hunterdon population was considered to be severely or
profoundly retarded. Id.
On March 16, 1977, the residents of Hunterdon filed a complaint in the Chancery Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey against the state agencies responsible for running the Hunterdon facility. Id. at 238-39, 445 A.2d at 706. The complaint
alleged that the defendant state agencies violated the residents' federal and state statutory rights as well as their constitutional rights to education and training befitting
their specific needs in the least-restrictive environment possible. Id. at 239, 445 A.2d
706. Although the court accepted the plaintiffs' understanding of their legal rights,
the trial court dismissed the complaint because the defendants, according to the
court, were satisfying their legal obligations to the residents of Hunterdon. Id. at 240,
445 A.2d at 706. Premised on the same reasoning expressed by the trial court, the
appellate division affirmed. Id.
On appeal, the court examined the three sets of rights in dispute: "(1) education
and training of the children at Hunterdon; (2) habilitation for adult residents at the
facility, and (3) provision of these services in the least restrictive setting feasible." Id.
at 243, 445 A.2d at 708.
51 Id. at 251-52, 445 A.2d at 712-13. Discussing the rights of the children, the court
held that the Legislature had "expressly granted the children at Hunterdon the right
to a thorough and efficient education suited to their individual needs and abilities" as
provided in the Developmentally Disabled Rights Act of 1977. Id. at 243, 445 A.2d at
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Additionally, the court asserted that state law grants residents
at an institutional facility the legal rights to habilitation, education,
care, and protection." The court held, in both instances, that the
services must be adapted to residents' individual needs and provided in an atmosphere that is least restrictive of their personal
liberty.5 3 In so ruling, the court substantiated the Legislature's obligation to ensure that the mentally retarded are included in the
community and given the opportunity to pursue their right to happiness as are all other citizens.'
In the same year the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Asso708 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:6D-1 to 6D-12 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995)). In addition to being governed by the policy considerations enunciated in the Disabled Rights
Act, the Division is also required to follow the State Board of Regulations regarding
the length of the school day, class size, and minimum hours of instruction. Id. at 24546, 445 A.2d at 709.
The State claimed that Hunterdon, in providing mandated educational services,
should be afforded flexibility in establishing educational programs for mentally-retarded children. Id. at 246, 445 A.2d at 709-10. Recognizing the special needs of
disabled children, the court emphasized that the Disabled Rights Act called for education to be suited to the individual needs and abilities of each child. Id. at 246, 445
A.2d at 710. Therefore, the court stressed that Hunterdon could make an individualized determination to meet a child's educational needs in a different manner than
proscribed by the Regulations. Id.
52 Id. at 251-52, 445 A.2d at 713. The defendants contended that state law only
required that they make such services available at the facility rather than actually imposing a duty to provide every habitant with each specific service. Id. at 247, 445 A.2d
at 710.
Relying on the Disabled Rights Act, the court rejected the defendants' claims. Id.
at 247-48, 445 A.2d at 710-11. As provided by the Act, the court indicated that the
facilities that house developmentally-disabled persons are "legally required to provide
comprehensive evaluation, functional and guardianship services as hereafter designated, in order that eligible mentally-retarded persons may be provided with adequate training, care and protection." Id. at 248, 445 A.2d at 711 (citing N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 30:4-165.1 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995)). Additionally, the court noted that the
Act further requires that services provided for mentally-retarded residents shall be
provided on an individual basis in accordance with each person's individual needs.
Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995)). The court therefore
concluded that Hunterdon was not merely required to make the services generally
available to the residents but, rather, specifically available to each resident. Id. at 249,
445 A.2d at 711. The court reasoned that Hunterdon had such an obligation not only
because it is moral and just but also because it was the law. Id.
53 Id.
54 Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 89 N.J. at 252, 445 A.2d at 713. The court emphasized
that the services provided to the mentally disabled should be offered in the spirit of
optimism:
Like all other citizens, the mentally retarded have the right to pursue
happiness. Unlike other citizens, they have unique hurdles to overcome
in doing so. Rather than exclude them from the pursuit of happiness,
the Legislature has made an effort to include them in our civic community by providing them the special services they need to develop and
grow. This public policy affirms our common humanity. Their con-
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ciation for Retarded Citizens, the United States Supreme Court, in
Youngberg v. Romeo, 5 considered the substantive due process rights
of a mentally-retarded person who had been involuntarily committed.5 6 In Youngberg, the mother of Nicholas Romeo filed charges
on behalf of her profoundly-retarded son contending that his constitutional rights had been violated by the Pennhurst State Institution.5 7 Romeo's mother sought his admittance to a state facility as
a result of her inability to properly care for his condition.5 8
Throughout her son's residence at Pennhurst, Romeo's mother
continually objected to the abusive treatment her son received. 59
Pennhurst, however, ignored the complaints and refused to alter
the treatment given to Romeo.60
The Youngberg Court noted that commitment alone does not
deprive an individual of all substantive rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 6 1 Conceding that Romeo had a right to sufficient
cerns are our concerns. In this State, we do not set people adrift because they are the victim of misfortune. We take care of each other.
Id.
55 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
56 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state
cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 310. The Court described Romeo's condition as one of
profound retardation. Id. at 309. Romeo had resided with his parents until his father's death, at which time his mother sought Romeo's admittance to a state facility.
Id. Upon examination by a court-appointed physician and psychologist, the Philadelphia County Court of Common pleas determined that Romeo was unable to care for
himself, and the court ordered his commitment to Pennhurst State School and Hospital. Id. at 309-10.
In the original complaint, the Court noted, Romeo's mother alleged violations of
her son's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at
310. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Eighth Amendment
was an inappropriate source for determining the liberty interests of the involuntarily
committed. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980), aftd, 457 U.S.
307 (1982). The correct constitutional basis, according to the Third Circuit, was the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 156.
58 Id. at 309.
59 Id. at 310.
60 Id. In late 1976, Pennhurst transferred Romeo from the commitment ward to
the hospital to treat a broken arm. Id. During his treatment at the hospital, Dr.
Gabroy ordered Romeo to be physically restrained. Id. The doctor ordered the restraints to ensure Romeo's safety as well as the safety of the other patients. Id. at 31011. While the hospital's general policy was to return a patient to the ward once his
injury healed, Romeo did not return to the ward. Id. at 311. Rather, the defendants
decided Romeo should remain in the hospital as a result of the pending lawsuit. Id.
Due to the hospital's subsequent treatment of Romeo, his mother filed a second
amended complaint which alleged Romeo's prolonged restraint on a regular basis
and added a damages claim to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide adequate treatment for his condition. Id.
61 Id. at 315.
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food, clothing, shelter, and medical care,62 the Court indicated
that the issue at hand was whether an individual properly committed under state law enjoys a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training.6" The Court
recognized the existence of liberty interests in safety and freedom
of movement regardless of involuntary commitment.'
The Youngberg Court next addressed whether a protectable liberty interest in minimally-adequate habilitation existed. 65 The
Court found that a state does have a duty to provide certain services to those who are institutionalized.6 6 According to the Court,
Romeo held liberty interests that required the state to provide him
with sufficient training that ensured his safety as well as freedom
from any undue interference.
Building upon the framework established by state and federal
precedent, the NewJersey Supreme Court, in In re M.R., identified
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
Id.
64 Id. The Court explained that Romeo's liberty interest in safety constituted a
right to personal security. Id. The Youngberg Court noted further that "the right to
personal security constitutes a 'historic liberty interest' protected substantively by the
Due Process Clause." Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
The Court reasoned that because these liberty interests survived criminal conviction
or incarceration, they certainly would survive involuntary commitment. Id. at 315-16.
In recognizing Romeo's right to freedom of movement, the Court emphasized
that freedom from bodily restraint has always been a longstanding protectable interest at the core of the Due Process Clause. Id. at 316. As such, the Court indicated that
the existence of such a right remains intact for incarcerated criminals and, therefore,
must also exist for the involuntarily committed. Id.
65 Id. Romeo defined his liberty interest as a "constitutional right to minimally
adequate habilitation." Id. The Court noted the inconsistent interpretations of the
term habilitation, but referred to the American Psychiatric Association's definition of
habilitation as "training and development of needed skills." Id. at 316-17, 309 n.1
(citation omitted).
66 Id. at 317. In determining the existence of a right to training, the court emphasized that a state is ordinarily not required to provide services for persons within its
borders. Id. The court noted, however, when a person is institutionalized they are
entirely dependent on the state and the state subsequently acquires a duty to provide
particular services and care. Id.
67 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319. To reach its holding, the Court considered a concurring opinion by Chief Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit, in which he observed, "[t] he
existence of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no longer a novel legal
proposition." Id. 318-19 (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 176 (3d. Cir.
1980) (Seitz, C.J., concurring)).
The Youngberg Court limited the scope of its holding to those instances where
habilitation or care is necessary to avoid unconstitutional infringement on the individual's liberty interest in safety and freedom. Id. at 317-18. Therefore, the Youngberg
decision does not address whether an involuntarily-committed mentally-retarded person has a general constitutional privilege to training per se. Id. at 318.
62

63
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two issues to be considered on appeal.' First, the court addressed
the applicable standard for determining the specific capacity of a
developmentally-disabled person to decide where to live.69 Second, the court analyzed the appropriate role of appointed counsel
in a guardianship action.7 °
Prior to addressing these main issues, Justice Pollock identified several concerns arising out of an incompetency determination.7" Although only nominally considering the burden of proof,
the justice acknowledged that underlying such an allocation of
proof remained significant policy considerations regarding a developmentally-disabled person's right to make independent decisions
and the court's role in that decision-making process. 72 The court
noted that the definition of "developmentally disabled" encompassed many conditions unrelated to an individual's intellectual capacity. 73 Therefore, given the expansive definition, the justice
recognized that the scope of the decision will impact the ability of
74
developmentally-disabled people to have control over their lives.
Justice Pollock next explained that our traditional sources of
law evidence a commitment to preserving a person's right to selfdetermination, including the developmentally disabled. 7 5 In fur68

In re M.R., 135 N.J. 155, 159, 638 A.2d 1274, 1276 (1994).

Id.
70 Id.
69

Id. at 165, 638 A.2d at 1279.
Id.
Id. According to the Disabled Rights Act:
a. Developmentally Disabled means a severe chronic disability of a person which:
(1) is attributable to a mental or physical impairment or combination of
mental or physical impairments;
(2) is manifest before age 22;
(3) is likely to continue indefinitely;
(4) results in substantial functional limitations in three or more of the
following areas of major life activity... ;
(5) reflects the need for a combination and sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic care, treatment or other services which are of
lifelong or extended duration and are individually planned and coordinated. Developmental disability includes but is not limited to sever disabilities attributable to mental retardation, autism, cerebral palsy,
epilepsy, spina bifida and other neurological impairments ....
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-3(a) (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
74 M.R, 135 N.J. at 166, 638 A.2d at 1279. The varying nature and severity of
disabilities result in different situations from person to person. Id. at 165-66, 638 A.2d
at 1279. Therefore, the consequence of the disability does not always affect an individual's ability to make decisions. Id. at 166, 638 A.2d at 1279.
75 Id., 638 A.2d at 1279. The right of self-determination is implicit in the state
constitution that recognizes that all persons have certain inalienable rights, including
the enjoyment of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. See NJ. CONST. art. I, cl. 1.
71
72
73
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therance of that concern, the justice maintained that courts, as
protectors of personal rights, have a responsibility to preserve the
right of self-determination.7 6 Justice Pollock recognized, however,
the difficulty that arises in preserving an incompetent person's
right of self-determination while meeting the judicial obligation to
protect that person's best interests.7 7
The New Jersey Supreme Court, the justice observed, had
never been confronted with a balancing of the competing interests
involved in the case subjudice.7 3 Therefore, the M.R. court looked
to an analogous line of cases concerning the termination of medical treatment. 79 Justice Pollock acknowledged that, in those cases,
the court applied one of two tests: a substituted-judgment test8 ° or
Similarly, the Legislature declared that the developmentally disabled, as citizens, are
entitled to certain fundamental rights that can not be abrogated by admission to a
facility for disabled persons. See Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:6D-2 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
76 M.R., 135 N.J. at 166, 638 A.2d at 1280 (citing In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 345, 486
A.2d 1209, 1221 (1985)).
77 Id. at 167, 638 A.2d at 1280.
78 See id. (stating that the New Jersey Supreme Court had balanced competing interests in analogous cases).
79 Id.; see, e.g., In re Farrell, 108 NJ. 335, 349, 529 A.2d 404, 411 (1987) (holding
that a competent, terminally-ill patient's right to privacy and self-determination outweigh the state's countervailing interest in preserving that person's life); In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 359, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (1985) (concluding that certain individualsnewborns, mentally retarded persons, and permanently comatose individuals--do not
lack a right of self-determination because they are unable to speak for themselves on
life-and-death issues regarding their medical care); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-41,
355 A.2d 647, 663-64 (1976) (recognizing that the right to terminate a noncognitive,
vegetative existence is a valuable right incident to an individual's right to privacy and
should not be discarded solely on the basis that such a condition prevents an individual from exercising that choice).
A competent patient's right of self-determination encompasses the right to select
treatment alternatives, including the right to terminate medical treatment. Farrell
108 N.J. at 348, 529 A.2d at 410 (citing Conroy, 98 N.J. at 347, 486 A.2d at 1222). A
person's right to refuse medical treatment, however, is not absolute. Id. Countervailing societal interests may outweigh the right to decline life-sustaining treatment.
Conroy, 98 NJ. at 348, 486 A.2d at 1223. The state may limit a patient's right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment to preserve life, prevent suicide, safeguard the character of
the medical profession, or to protect innocent third parties. Id. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at
1223.
80 M.R, 135 N.J. at 167, 638 A.2d at 1280. The substituted judgment approach is
"intended to ensure that the surrogate decision-maker effectuates as much as possible
the decision that the incompetent patient would make if he or she were competent."
In reJobes, 108 N.J. 394, 414, 529 A.2d 434, 444 (1987). In the instances where an
incompetent's wishes have not been clearly articulated, a surrogate decision-maker
must consider the patient's value system, prior statements regarding medical issues,
and any personality traits, particularly pertinent philosophical, theological, and ethical values that would provide guidance as to the patient's choice of conduct. Id. at
414-15, 529 A.2d at 444. The focus of the substituted judgment test, according to

1995]

NOTE

423

a best-interest test."' According to the justice, application of either
test represented a balancing of both subjective and objective information in order to reach a decision that best respects the right of
self-determination .82
After laying this foundation, Justice Pollock commenced his
analysis by recounting the court's decision in Grady.8 3 In Grady, the
justice reminded, the court held that an application of the best
interest test should only be instituted when the proponents of sterilizing a developmentally-disabled person demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the disabled person is incapable of making the decision of whether to be sterilized. 84 The Grady courtjusJustice Pollock, is the choice the patient would have made and not what a reasonable
person would decide. M.R, 135 N.J. at 167, 638 A.2d at 1280.
81 Id. Alternatively, the M.R court explained, patients who are unable to produce
evidence of their preference are relegated to a best-interest determination. Id. The
Conroy court acknowledged that the state, in exercising its parens patriaepower, "supports the authority of its courts to allow decisions to be made for an incompetent that
serve the incompetent's best interests, even if the person's wishes can not be clearly
established." Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364-65, 486 A.2d at 1231. Exercising this authority, a
state may permit guardians to deny an incompetent patient life-sustaining medical
treatment if it is evident that such conduct would advance the patient's best interest.
Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1231.
The court in Conroy divided the best interest test into two methods of analysis: a
limited-objective test or a pure-objective test. Id., 486 A.2d at 1231-32. According to
the limited-objective test, where there is reliable evidence that an incompetent patient
suffering from irreversible physical and mental impairments would have refused lifesustaining treatment, the treatment may be withheld or withdrawn, if the decisionmaker is clearly satisfied that the burdens of continuing the patient's life with the
treatment outweigh the benefits of that life. Id., 486 A.2d at 1232.
Under the pure-objective test, life-sustaining treatment may still be withheld even
in the absence of evidence that the patient would have refused the treatment. Id. at
366, 486 A.2d at 1232. The pure-objective test requires that the net burdens of continuing the patient's life outweigh any benefits that patient derives from life and that
the effect of the continual and severe pain endured by the patient is such that administering the medical treatment would be inhumane. Id.
82 M.R, 135 N.J. at 167-68, 638 A.2d at 1280 (citation omitted). Some commentators have criticized the inadequacies of the substituted-judgment and best-interest
tests to protect an incompetent patient's right to self-determination. See, e.g., John
Parry, A Unified Theory of Substitute Consent: Incompetent Patients' Right to Individualized
Health Care Decision-Making, 11 MENTAL & PHYs. DISABILITY L. REP. 378, 378 (1987)
(favoring a unified substitute consent theory as the best method to preserve personal
autonomy while achieving judicial consistency).
83 M.R, 135 N.J. at 168, 638 A.2d at 1280 (citing In re Grady, 85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d
467 (1981)). The Grady decision involved a mentally-disabled woman suffering from
Down's Syndrome whose parents sought to have her sterilized. Grady, 85 N.J. at 240,
242, 426 A.2d at 469, 470. For a detailed discussion of the Grady case, see supra notes
42-48 and accompanying text.
84 M.R, 135 N.J. at 168, 638 A.2d at 1280-81 (citing In re Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426
A.2d at 483). The Grady court expounded that the parenspatriaepower of the state is
expansive enough to include the decision "whether consent for sterilization should be
given by a court on behalf of a person who lacks the capacity to give or withhold
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tified its conclusions, Justice Pollock recalled, by emphasizing the
importance of protecting
a mentally-impaired person's right of
5
8

self-determination.

Building upon the Grady holding, Justice Pollock maintained
that a party seeking to overcome a generally competent person's
right of self-determination bears a significant burden.8 6 As indicated by the varying degree of mental capacities, Justice Pollock
asserted that developmentally-disabled persons can differ greatly in
their capability to make decisions.8 7 Therefore, Justice Pollock acknowledged, a generally incompetent person is not automatically
consent for himself." Grady, 85 N.J. at 259, 426 A.2d at 479. In determining whether
to authorize sterilization, the Grady court delineated several conditions. Id. at 263,
426 A.2d at 482 (citation omitted). First, the duty to decide the necessity of sterilization rests with the court rather than the parents. Id. at 264, 426 A.2d at 482 (citing
Prince v. Massachussets, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)). Second, in instances where an
application is made to receive authorization to sterilize an alleged mental incompetent, the court must appoint an independent guardian ad litem. Id. Third, the court
must determine that the incompetent is incapable of making a decision regarding
sterilization and that the incapacity is not likely to dissipate in the future. Id. at 265,
426 A.2d at 482. Lastly, the proponents of sterilization must persuade the court by
clear and convincing evidence that the sterilization is in the best interest of the incompetent person. Id. at 266, 426 A.2d at 483. By application of such standards,
according to the Grady court, "courts will be able to protect the human rights of people least able to protect themselves." Id. at 272, 426 A.2d at 486.
85 M.R., 135 NJ. at 168, 638 A.2d at 1281 (citing Grady, 85 NJ. at 261, 426 A.2d at
480-81). The Grady court reaffirmed that "the right to choose among procreation,
sterilization and other methods of contraception is an important privacy right of all
individuals." Grady, 85 N.J. at 252, 426 A.2d at 475. The Grady decision recognized
that it is the courts' obligation to preserve a person's right to privacy. Id. The Grady
court indicated, however, that an incompetent may fail to have the mental capacity to
make a choice regarding sterilization. Id. In such a situation, the Grady court held
that a court incurs the responsibility to exercise that right on the incompetent's behalf in a manner that reflects the best interest of the incompetent. Id.
86 M.R, 135 NJ. at 168, 638 A.2d at 1281.
87 Id. at 169, 638 A.2d at 1281. Justice Pollock distinguished M.R.'s mental impairment from that of Lee Ann Grady. Id. The justice classified M.R.'s impairment as
moderate in contrast to Lee Ann, who the justice categorized as severely impaired. Id.
The different level of impairment between M.R. and Lee Ann, Justice Pollock reminded, substantiates the wide spectrum of abilities possessed by the developmentally
disabled. Id.
Justice Pollock enumerated the seriousness of the incompetents' decision as a
second distinction between the two cases. Id. Thejustice explained that the nature of
M.R's decision of where to live is one that could be easily changed. Id. In contrast,
Justice Pollock asserted, the decision to be sterilized is one much more difficult to
correct. Id. Despite the acknowledgment that the greater the importance of the decision the greater the right of the affected person to make the decision, Justice Pollock
refused to abandon the court's obligation to those persons unable to make independent decisions. Id. To balance the competing interests at stake, Justice Pollock elucidated the court's goal as one that permits "developmentally-disabled people to make
as many decisions as possible, while protecting them from the harmful effects of bad
decisions that they do not fully understand." Id.
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considered incompetent for all purposes.8 8
Following the court's recognition of the varying abilities
among the developmentally disabled, the court addressed the
growing awareness and concern for the rights of the developmentally disabled.89 The court noted that recent legislation at both the
state and federal level has shown greater sensitivity to the right to
individual autonomy of the developmentally-disabled.9" Additionally, Justice Pollock commented that guardianship actions have
similarly reflected an attempt to maximize the disabled's right to
self-determination by contemplating limited-rather than complete-guardianship arrangements. 91
88 Id. (citing Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 483). Justice Pollock indicated that
a generally incompetent person can still have the ability to make decisions about specific matters. Id. Considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case, the
justice contended that a person incapable of managing his daily affairs may still possess the capability to decide with whom and where to reside. Id.
89 Id. at 169, 638 A.2d at 1281. For a further discussion of the evolution of the
rights of the developmentally disabled, see supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
90 See id. at 169-70, 638 A.2d at 1281 (illustrating actions taken by both the United
States Congress and New Jersey Legislature). In 1990, the United States Congress
enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp.
111991). In passing the ADA, Congress recognized the increasing number of persons
suffering from mental disabilities and the pervasive history of society to unjustly isolate and discriminate against those individuals. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (Supp. 111991).
In seeking to rectify the disparate treatment of the disabled, the ADA proposes:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the
elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter on behalf of individuals
with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power
to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and to regulate commerce, in
order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by
people with disabilities.
42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. 11 1991).
In addition to legislation at the federal level, NewJersey has enacted similar statutory provisions to ensure the protection of the fundamental rights of the developmentally disabled. Developmentally Disabled Rights Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:6D-1 to 6D22 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995). Recognizing that growing numbers of the developmentally disabled are being placed in state community residences rather than institutions, the Act attempts to clarify the rights of the developmentally disabled to best
protect their well-being. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:6D-13 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995).
91 M.R., 135 NJ. at 170, 638 A.2d at 1281 (citing Guardianship: An Agenda for Reform: Recommendations of the National GuardianshipSymposium and Policy of the American
Bar Association, 13 MrrAL & P, s. Dis~aiLuTy L. REP. 274, 274 (1989) [hereinafter
Agendafor Reform]). Justice Pollock praised the recommendations of the symposium,
which sought to meet the needs of the disabled while providing the maximum individual autonomy possible. Id., 638 A.2d at 1281-82 (quoting Agenda for Reform, supra at
275). Additionally, Justice Pollock mentioned other recommendations made by the
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The court indicated, however, that the issue at hand concerned the appointment of M.R.'s mother as guardian and the decision that M.R. should reside in her home.92 To resolve this issue,
Justice Pollock mandated that a remand was necessary to reconsider the guardianship appointment in light of the findings by the
New Jersey Supreme Court.9"
After ordering a remand of the case to the chancery division,
Justice Pollock next addressed the second issue on appeal, the appropriate role of appointed counsel in a guardianship action.9 4
The court recognized that solving the issue required answering the
question of whether the appropriate role of counsel in a guardianship action for an incompetent is to vigorously advocate the incompetent's position or merely advise the court of counsel's judgment
committee, including a statutory presumption favoring a limited, in contrast to a general, guardianship. Id., 638 A.2d at 1282 (citing Agenda for Reform, supra at 301).
Although New Jersey has not adopted section 5-306(c) of the Uniform Probate
Code (UPC) that allows limited rather than general guardians, the justice suggested
that trial courts follow the lead of other states which have adopted the UPC and appoint limited guardians in appropriate instances. Id. at 170-71, 638 A.2d at 1282 (citing UPC § 5-306(c)).
92 M.R., 135 N.J. at 171, 638 A.2d at 1282.
93 Id. Justice Pollock remanded the case to the chancery division to determine
whether M.R is capable of expressing a preference to live with her father. Id. Justice
Pollock indicated that if M.R. again conveys a preference to reside with her father, the
burden rests with M.R.'s mother to prove by clear and convincing evidence that M.R.
is incapable of making that decision. Id. See also Grady, 85 N.J. at 265, 426 A.2d at 483
(requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof that the individual to be sterilized
does not have the capacity to consent or withhold consent); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) (finding that the clear and convincing standard of proof
strikes an appropriate balance between an individual's rights and the interests of the
state with regards to civil commitment cases); In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 641 (Cal.
1980) (emphasizing that the person requesting sterilization must overcome a strong
presumption against sterilizing an incompetent person by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence); In re Penny N., 414 A.2d 541, 543 (N.H. 1980) (holding that the proponent of sterilizing an incompetent person bears the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence that the incompetent person lacks the capacity to consent to the
sterilization).
Justice Pollock instructed further that if, on remand, the trial court determines
M.R. is incapable of deciding where to reside, the burden falls on M.R.'s father, as the
party altering the status quo, to prove that a change in domicile would be in the best
interest of M.R. MR, 135 N.J. at 171-72, 638 A.2d at 1282 (citing State v. Fields, 77
N.J. 282, 304 n.9, 390 A.2d 574, 585 (1978)) (submitting that the burden of proof
rests with the party attempting to change the status of the committed person); Sorentino v. Family & Children's Soc'y, 74 N.J. 313, 317, 378 A.2d 18, 20 (1977) (placing
the burden of proof on the natural parents as the party seeking to change the status
quo by removing the child from the custody of the adoptive parents).
94 Id. at 172, 638 A.2d at 1282. M.R's father contended that the appointed counsel in the guardianship hearing failed to adequately advocate his daughter's preference to reside with him. Id. M.R.'s father claimed that as a result of counsel's
failures, the hearing was unfair to M.R. Id.
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of the incompetent's best interest.9 5 The problem, Justice Pollock
indicated, rested in the confusion between the respective roles of
an attorney and a guardian ad litem. 96 To correct the confusion,
the court turned to the determination of several fact-finding committees 9 7 that recommended an advocacy role for the attorney of a
minor rather than the more neutral role of a guardian ad litem. 98
Building upon the analogous context of counsel's role with
95 Id. According to R. 4:86-4(b) of the NewJersey Rules Governing Civil Practice,
appointed counsel in a guardianship proceeding:
shall be responsible to meet with the alleged incompetent; to make inquiry of persons having knowledge of the alleged incompetent's circumstances, his or her physical and mental state and his or her estate; and to
file, in lieu of an answer, a written report of findings and recommendations to the court at least three days prior to the hearing.
Id., 638 A.2d at 1283 (citing N.J. CT. R. 4:86-4(b)).
As required, the trial court appointed Mr. Hunczak as M.R.'s attorney. Id. at 173,
638 A.2d at 1283. In accordance with R. 4:86-4(b), Mr. Hunczak conducted interviews
with M.R., her mother, and her father. Id. As a result of his findings, Mr. Hunczak
submitted a written report concluding that M.R. was competent and that considerable
weight should be given to her preference to reside with her father. Id. Mr. Hunczak
reached a different conclusion, however, following M.R.'s interview in chambers. Id.
Mr. Hunczak's changed position indicated that "less weight should be afforded to
[M.R.'s] choice to live with [her father] than he had originally indicated and that
either household would serve M.R.'s best interests." Id. Although counsel's written
report complied with R. 4:86-4(b), Justice Pollock proffered that Mr. Hunczak's
change in position raised questions as to the proper role of appointed counsel for an
incompetent in accordance with R. 4:86-4(b). Id.
96 Id. at 173, 638 A.2d at 1283. Justice Pollock recounted the related context of
child-custody cases to clarify the confusion among the respective roles of court-appointed counsel and court-appointed guardians ad litem. Id. (citation omitted). The
justice advised that the 1987-88 Annual Report of the Supreme Court's Family Division Practice Committee distinguished the purpose of the roles. Id. According to the
report, Justice Pollock submitted, the services of court-appointed counsel are to be
performed for the child. Id. The justice agreed that "'[c]ounsel acts as an independent legal advocate for the best interests of the child and takes an active part in the
hearing, ranging from subpoenaing and cross-examining witnesses to appealing the
decision, if warranted."' Id. (quotation omitted). Conversely, Justice Pollock responded, the services of a court-appointed guardian ad litem are to the court on the
child's behalf as indicated by the report. Id. Justice Pollock agreed with the report
that the role of a court-appointed guardian is that of an independent fact-finder,
evaluator, and investigator to determine what advances the child's best interest. Id.
The report further indicated that a guardian ad litem would be appointed if the
court's purpose of the appointment is for fact-finding and independent investigation.
Id.
97 Thejustice relied on the findings of the Judiciary Surrogate Liaison Committee,
the Civil Practice Committee, and the Family Division Practice Committee. Id. at 17374, 638 A.2d at 1283.
98 M.R. 135 N.J. at 173-74, 638 A.2d at 1283. The report of the Judiciary Surrogates Committee provided:
"[the role of the representative attorney is entirely different from that
of a guardian ad litem. The representative attorney is a zealous advocate
for the wishes of the client. The guardian ad item evaluates for himself
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regard to a minor, the court similarly urged an advocacy role for
the attorney of an incompetent. 99 At present, according to Justice
Pollock, the Rules of Professional Conduct'00 serve as a guidepost
in defining the role of an attorney for an incompetent. 01' By recognizing an adversarial role for the attorney of an incompetent,
or herself what is in the best interests of his or her client-ward and then
represent[s] the client-ward in accordance with that judgment."
Id. (quotation omitted). Additionally, Justice Pollock indicated that the Family Division Practice Committee has proposed an amendment to the Official Comment to
Rules 5:8A and 5:8B to further clarify the roles of counsel and guardians ad item. Id.
at 174, 638 A.2d at 1283. The proposed amendment advises attorneys who are representing children in abuse or neglect cases and parental rights cases to act as counsel
for the child in accordance with R. 5:8A rather than as a guardian ad litem pursuant to
R. 5:8B. Id.
The proposed amendment indicates that an attorney appointed for a child in a
termination of parental rights case usually assumes a hybrid role, acting as counsel as
well as guardian ad /tem Id. at 174, 638 A.2d at 1283-84. The Committee urges that
the role of an attorney should be more clearly defined as one serving as an advocate
for the child. Id., 638 A.2d at 1284. To adequately protect a child's fundamental
rights, only zealous representation is appropriate. Id. In those instances where an
appointment of a guardian ad item is equally necessary, the Committee advises that
counsel for the child may request such an appointment. Id. Furthermore, the Committee contends that by clarifying the role of an attorney as counsel for the child,
evidentiary and procedural problems will also be solved. Id.
99 M.R, 135 NJ. at 175, 638 A.2d at 1284. Justice Pollock recognized that the
situation between minors and incompetents is not identical; however, the similarities
shared by both warrant consideration of the Family Division's findings in the context
of an incompetent. Id. In so doing, the justice suggested that the Committee consider amending Rule 4:86 in accordance with the changes made to Rules 5:8A and
5:8B. Id. The justice noted further that incorporating such changes in the present
rule will more adequately protect those incompetents who need an attorney and a
guardian ad item. Id.
100 Id. Justice Pollock referenced New Jersey Rule of Professional Conduct 1.14,
which provides:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority, mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far
as reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with
the client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian, or take other
protective action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot adequately act in the client's own
interest.
Id. (citing NJ. R.P.C. 1.14).
101 Id. at 175, 638 A.2d at 1284. In representing a client, Justice Pollock reminded,
an attorney's course of conduct must be governed by the client's decisions regarding
the objectives of the representation. Id. at 176, 638 A.2d at 1284 (citing NJ. R.P.C.
1.2(a)). The role of an attorney, according to the justice, "is not to determine
whether the client is competent to make a decision, but to advocate the decision that
the client makes." Id. The justice added, however, that the attorney's role does not
encompass advocating decisions that are obviously ridiculous or that present a risk of
danger to the client. Id., 638 A.2d at 1284-85.
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Justice Pollock acknowledged that the opportunity for other issues
to be contested would no longer be foreclosed. 10 2 To further substantiate the need for redefining an attorney's obligations to an
incompetent client, Justice Pollock turned to other jurisdictions
that have mandated counsel to vigorously protect0 3the desires of an
incompetent in a civil commitment proceeding.1
While the court awaits the amendments to Rule 4:86, Justice
Pollock offered several guidelines to aid an attorney for an incompetent. 10 4 First, the justice emphasized that the declaration of a
developmentally-disabled person as incompetent does not necessarily deprive the disabled individual of the right to make every
decision.1" 5 Second, Justice Pollock continued, the attorney for a
developmentally-disabled person should advocate all decisions
court added, however,
made by the disabled person. 1° 6 The M.
that if the attorney perceived a conflict between the individual's
preferences and the individual's best interests, the attorney was
fully able to inform the court of the necessity for a guardian ad
litem. °7 Finally, Justice Pollock requested that adequate training
be provided for judges to better communicate with the developmentally-disabled.' 0 8
In light of the historic past of discrimination and mistreatment

102 Id., 638 A.2d at 1285 (citing An Agenda for Reform, supra note 91, at 284). Justice
Pollock noted that the attorney, by assuming the role of advocate, could pursue other
concerns such as the guardian's identity or the incompetent's place of residence. Id.
Justice Pollock contrasted the troubling results where an attorney's advocacy is diluted
by misplaced concern for the incompetent's best interest. Id.
Commentators have suggested that attorneys who interject their perceptions of
the incompetent's best interest provide merely procedural formality rather than zealous representation. Frolik, supra note 2, at 634-35. Frolik also warned that an attorney who assumes a role guided by the best interest standard may be venturing into an
area that the attorney is ill-equipped to address. Id. at 635.
103 MR., 135 NJ. at 177, 638 A.2d at 1285 (citing Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378,
389 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (establishing that the proposed civil committee is entitled to the
right to representative counsel occupying a traditional adversarial role); In re Link,
713 S.W.2d 487, 496 (Mo. 1986) (deciding that the role of appointed counsel is to act
as an advocate for the proposed ward); Quesnell v. State, 517 P.2d 568, 576 (Wash.
1974) (commenting that a guardian ad litem is appointed to preserve the rights and
protect the best interest of the alleged incompetent); State v. Lazaro, 202 S.E.2d 109,
126 (W. Va. 1974) (holding that the role of an appointed guardian ad litem is to vigorously represent the alleged incompetent as the bounds of ethics will allow).
104 Id. at 177, 638 A.2d at 1285.
105 Id.
106 Id. at 177-78, 638 A.2d at 1285.
107 Id. at 178, 638 A.2d at 1285 (citation omitted).
108 Id., 638 A.2d at 1286.
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against the developmentally-disabled, 1°9 the New Jersey Supreme
Court correctly recognized in M.R. the need to better protect the
rights of the developmentally-disabled. The M.R. decision reflects
a well-needed effort to grant greater respect to the interest of developmentally-disabled individuals in autonomous decision-making.1 1 ° Although the M.R court placed the burden on the party
challenging the disabled person's capacity,"1 the court gave little
credence to M.R.'s expressed preference to live with her father." 2
Recognizing M.R.'s expression of a preference, even if that preference stemmed from a simplistic understanding," 3 is the only
means to truly respect M.R.'s right to self-determination.
Danielle Priola

109 See supra note I (discussing the mistreatment and discrimination suffered by the
developmentally disabled).
110 See Frolik, supra note 2, at 660 (discussing the need for guardianship reform to
strike a better balance between a developmentally-disabled person's interest in autonomous decision-making and the need to protect that person from being deprived of
their liberty under the false pretext of consent).
111 MR, 135 NJ. at 169, 638 A.2d at 1281.
112 Id. at 171, 638 A.2d at 1282.
113 Id. at 163, 638 A.2d at 1278; see supra note 21 (discussing M.R's capacity to
express a preference).

